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Abstract 
This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in Ukraine 
using a unique data set of more than 2200 Ukrainian firms operating in both the 
manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector for the years 1998-2000. There are 
several important findings in the paper. Job destruction is dominating job creation in both 
1999 and 2000. In connection with other evidence we infer from this that Ukraine is only 
at the beginning of the restructuring process. The most clear-cut result of our analysis is 
the strong positive effect of new private firms on net employment growth, a finding 
established for other transition economies as well. At the same time, we do not find 
differences in the employment growth of state-owned and privatised firms. Apart from 
ownership effects we also find, at the firm level, an inverse correlation of size and net 
employment growth and of size and job reallocation. Finally, we establish that strong 
foreign trade links force firms to shed labour more aggressively and to engage in more 
restructuring when trade is directed to and originating from Western economies. This 
disciplining function is absent when the trade flows are confined to CIS countries.   
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I. Introduction 
 
 
It is generally known that ‘flexibility’ of the labour market is an important feature of 
well-functioning market economies.  Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996) and Baldwin, 
Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) report that in the U.S. and in Canada roughly one in every 
ten jobs is created and one in every ten jobs is destroyed each year. Flexibility of the 
labour market is important because it permits the rapid reallocation of resources to the 
most efficient uses and thus it may be vital for economic growth. As suggested by 
Aghion and Howitt (1994), we might expect a relationship between gross job creation, 
destruction and productivity growth. Firms (sectors) that engage in restructuring destroy 
low productivity jobs and create high productivity ones. This leads to high job turnover 
and an increase in labour productivity. Therefore, a positive correlation between 
productivity growth and job turnover might be expected. However, a high degree of job 
reallocation may also have negative effects, at least in the short run, in terms of worker 
displacement and earnings losses, but the aggregate and long run benefits are more likely 
to compensate the individual costs. 
These issues are particularly relevant for the post-communist economies, 
characterized by highly distorted factor allocations and many inefficient firms. The 
reallocation of labour from inefficient firms (usually non-restructured state and privatised 
firms) to efficient ones (usually new private and restructured state and privatised firms) is 
a desirable feature of a successful transition from plan to market. Blanchard (1997) has 
pointed out that such an optimal reallocation is not straightforward to achieve. If the 
collapse in employment in the state sector is too large such that the slowly emerging new 
private sector cannot sufficiently compensate the job loss in the state sector, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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unemployment will result. On the one hand high unemployment implies lower wages, 
which is good for job creation. However, high unemployment also implies that the 
private sector needs to be taxed more in order to finance the unemployment benefit 
system, which in turn dampens job creation.  
The purpose of this paper is to study gross flows of jobs in Ukraine, a transition 
country that has been lagging behind in reforms. In doing so, we hope to contribute to the 
ongoing debate between gradual versus rapid approaches to reform (e.g. Roland, 1994). 
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) analyse the role of labour market flexibility for a 
small transition economy, Estonia. According to their findings, Estonia’s transition 
process is a success story. The country’s rapid approach to reform has led the economy to 
sustainable GDP growth and to rates of job reallocation similar to those reported for 
Western economies. Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) analyse gross flows of jobs 
in Poland at the start of transition and find high rates of gross job destruction, which are 
concentrated in state owned enterprises. This suggests that state owned enterprises in 
Poland rapidly engaged in downsizing. They also find that new private firms contribute 
disproportionately to job growth in the economy. The same patterns are found for most of 
the other Central and East European countries as shown in Faggio and Konings (2000).  
Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997) and Estrin and Svejnar (1998) find in the context of a 
labour demand model for the Czech and Slovak Republics and for Poland that firms 
adjusted their labour force fairly rapidly at the start of transition.  
However, apart from Russia, little is known about the reallocation process in the slow 
reforming economies of the CIS, which experience the most severe output collapse and 
where no real signs of recovery are seen. For Russia, Brown and Earle (2002) find that William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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job destruction and reallocation rose markedly after the beginning and that job 
destruction was concentrated among the less productive firms in the second half of the 
nineties. Konings and Lehmann (2002), in addition, show that five years into the Russian 
transition employment responses in privatised firms are more strongly negatively 
correlated with wage movements than in state-owned firms pointing to the possibly 
slowly emerging beneficial effects of privatisation on productivity. The data sets of both 
cited papers on Russia do not include new private firms, their contribution to the 
employment growth of the Russian economy is documented in Acquisti and Lehmann 
(2000). According to their evidence new private firms have disproportionately high job 
creation  and destruction rates, the latter of which might be attributed to a relatively 
hostile environment for new businesses in Russia and the inexperience of managers to 
operate in this environment. Since we have in one of our Ukrainian data sets information 
on whether a Ukrainian firm is state-owned, privatised or new private we can investigate 
such ownership effects in this paper. 
  Another strand of the literature on gross job flows considers the link between 
foreign trade and job creation and destruction tying it in with the debate on the effects of 
globalisation on employment in the domestic labour market. For example, Levinsohn 
(2000) explores the effects of trade liberalisation on the Chilean labour market and finds 
that size and macro effects overwhelm any trade effects, i.e. export-led, import-
competing and non-traded sectors had similar employment patterns once size and macro 
shocks were controlled for.  Klein, Schuh and Triest (2002) identify trade-related 
adjustment costs by estimating the effects of real exchange rates on labour reallocation 
using detailed data on U.S. manufacturing industries for the years 1973 through 1993.  In William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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a transition context, the effects of trade on job reallocation have not yet found much 
interest, even though the rapid opening up of transition economies to world markets 
seems to provide the basis for an excellent natural experiment. Trade ties of Ukrainian 
manufacturing sectors with Western markets were virtually non-existent before 
independence, but developed rapidly since then. It strikes us, therefore, as fruitful to 
investigate how the relative openness of a sector, in which a firm operates, impacts upon 
the creation and destruction of jobs in this firm.   
The paper has as one aim to document gross job flows in both the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing sectors in Ukraine for the years 1999 and 2000, when Ukraine started 
to emerge from a very prolonged period of contraction and economic depression. It is the 
first paper that uses representative firm level data, which cover a large fraction of 
employment in both the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors, in order to 
contrast gross job flows in these two sectors. Since the Ukrainian economy was even 
more biased towards the manufacturing sector under central planning than other Soviet 
and East European economies, it is of interest to see whether there are significant 
differences in net employment growth between the two sectors that lead to a shrinking of 
the manufacturing sector and an expansion of the non-manufacturing sector as a move in 
the direction of a market economy would suggest. Of particular interest is in this context 
whether job creation or job destruction is the driving force behind this possibly different 
net employment growth.   
The main data set that we use has information on ownership types of firms, i.e. we 
can distinguish between new private, privatised and state-owned enterprises. This allows 
us to contribute to the ongoing debate about the effects of ownership on employment William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
  5
growth. Many papers have indicated that the employment adjustment in terms of gross 
flows of jobs is not very different between privatised and state-owned enterprises, but 
that most of the dynamics emerges from the new private firms.
1 
A third contribution of this paper is the exploration of the link between the trade 
orientation of Ukrainian manufacturing industries and the employment adjustment of 
firms. Using data on trade flows at the 2-digit level we construct an index of relative 
openness that we employ in the analysis.   
In the next section we describe the data set and provide a brief review of the job flow 
measures that we will analyse. The section also discusses the construction of the index of 
relative openness and how it might capture various aspects of the increased trade flows of 
the Ukrainian manufacturing sector. Section III reports gross flows of jobs for the entire 
economy, for different sectors in the economy, for different size classes and ownership 
categories and according to the relative openness of the sector where firms are active. In 
section IV we report regressions that attempt to explain the determination of   
employment growth and job reallocation in Ukrainian firms, while section V concludes. 
II. Data, job flow measures and relative openness at the sector level 
  We are using two data sets to obtain a picture of gross flows of jobs in Ukraine. 
The first data set covers 7,303 “traditional” firms in manufacturing between 1996 and 
2000, of which 6189 can be used for our purposes. The data on the manufacturing sector 
is provided by the Government Statistical Committee (“Derzhkomstat”) and covers 
virtually the entire population of those manufacturing firms that already existed in Soviet 
times, allowing us to study the evolution of job flows over time for the “traditional” 
manufacturing sector. We are pretty sure that new private firms, even if they are large, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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are not part of the data, though. A further drawback of this data set is the lack of 
information on the ownership structure of firms. While this information exists, it is not 
easy accessible and we cannot explore this important dimension with it.  Hence, as this 
data set only covers the “traditional” manufacturing sector, we use it to illustrate the 
adjustment path of the “traditional” Ukrainian manufacturing sector over the latter half of 
the nineties and to check whether the job flow measures generated from the second data 
set are reasonable.  
This second data set is based on annual company accounts data of 2,239 
Ukrainian firms in both the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors, where we 
have annual observations for the years 1998-2000. These data are retrieved from the 
Amadeus data set compiled by Bureau Van Dijck, a commercial data provider. The 
Amadeus data set consists mostly of company accounts data of European Union firms, 
however, they also report information on some countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
To be included in the data set at least one of the following criteria has to be fulfilled: 
operating revenue must be at least 1.5 million Euro, total assets must be at least 3 million 
Euro or the number of employees has to be larger than 15. These restrictions on the data 
imply that micro firms are not included. Nevertheless, a substantial number of medium 
and small firms enters the data set. Abstracting from micro firms, the data is a 
representative sample of the population of firms and is therefore extremely useful in 
inferring some basic patterns of job reallocation in Ukraine. The ownership information 
of each firm in this second data set was matched in from an external source. The 
Amadeus data set includes the company names of all firms and based on that it was 
possible to identify the ownership information of the firm, taken from a listing of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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company names and their ownership status. Consequently, we were able to identify new 
private firms, privatised firms and state-owned enterprises.  Both cleaned data sets that 
we use in the analysis comprise only firms that we can identify with certainty as 
continuing firms, i.e. firms that have positive employment levels in all years. 
The Amadeus data set is preferred by us, even though the Derzhkomstat data set 
gives us nearly the universe of “traditional” manufacturing firms over a longer time 
period. Having samples of new private firms and of firms in the non-manufacturing 
sector in the Amadeus data set helps us to get a more accurate picture of the true situation 
of Ukrainian firms at the end of the nineties, i.e. in a period when the restructuring 
process seems to have just begun. In addition, sending workers on forced unpaid leave 
has been a very widespread practice of Ukrainian firms in the nineties. Sample data for 
the years 1996 through 2001 from a survey of firms from four regions undertaken by 
EERC-Kiev
2 shows that the fraction of workers on such leave is often very large. Clearly, 
widespread unpaid leave raises the question of how to define a job. Are workers who are 
sent on unpaid leave and who might eventually be called back still in possession of a job? 
If they are called back relatively soon, then the answer should be yes; if they, on the other 
hand, linger on in unpaid leave for a protracted period, it is hard to consider them as job 
holders. What the survey data show is that most firms call back their workers on unpaid 
leave within three months, although this information is only available for 2000 and 2001, 
when the economy was performing better than in the nineties. There is, however, clear 
evidence in these data that in 1999 and 2000 forced unpaid leave was less of a problem 
than in the earlier years.     William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Table A1 in the appendix gives some summary statistics of the Amadeus data set 
for the years 1999 and 2000. From the table it is clear that Ukrainian firms on average are 
still very large compared to the typical Western firms. Furthermore, not surprisingly, the 
average firm is larger in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector. 
But even in the non-manufacturing sector the average firm size is quite large, compared 
to Western standards. This suggests that firms even after 10 years of transition are still 
characterized by over-manning levels, something that will be further discussed in the next 
section. Ukraine started much later than e.g. Russia with the implementation market 
oriented reforms so that the initial restructuring phase that entails the elimination of over-
manning levels may just have started towards the end of the nineties. Secondly, the fact 
that the average firm size in the non-manufacturing sector is so large also suggests that 
some firms in the non-manufacturing sector were previously active in the manufacturing 
sector. This may have been the case if some of the services that were supplied within the 
typical traditional manufacturing firm under central planning were re-classified as non-
manufacturing firms, perhaps once they were privatised.  
We can also note that the average employment growth rates in the sample are 
negative in both sectors, with average employment contraction in the manufacturing 
sector being larger in absolute value in both years.   
Rates of gross and net job flows that are by now very much standard in the 
literature on job dynamics in Western economies (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, 1999) 
and the shares of job creation and job destruction are analysed in the paper. Gross job 
creation (pos) is defined as the sum of all employment gains in all expanding firms, while 
gross job destruction (neg) is the sum of all employment losses in all contracting firms in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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an economy, sector or region. Usually gross job destruction is expressed as a positive 
number. These gross job flows can be expressed as rates by dividing them by the total 
amount of jobs available in an economy, sector or region. The sum of the gross job 
creation rate and the gross job destruction rate is the gross job reallocation rate (gross), 
while the difference is the net aggregate employment growth rate (net) that can be 
observed in aggregate statistics. A measure of churning or reallocation of jobs which is 
over and above the amount of job reallocation necessary to accommodate a given net 
aggregate employment growth rate is the excess job reallocation rate and is defined as the 
gross job reallocation rate minus the modulus of the net aggregate employment growth 
rate (excess). 
While most of these job flow measures have the usual interpretation also in a 
transition context, one of these measures, the excess job reallocation rate, is a bit more 
controversial.  Some authors understand this rate as a measure of deep restructuring, 
while other authors, including us here, give it the more conventional interpretation of a 
sign of heterogeneous firm behaviour within a given sector and of genuine labour 
reallocation within a sector.  
The shares of job creation and destruction of specific sectors are given by the ratio 
of the number of created or destroyed jobs of these sectors over the number of all created 
or destroyed jobs. Comparing these shares to the employment size shares gives additional 
insights into the relative contributions of various categories of firms to the job creation 
and destruction process.  
We also look at the one-year persistence rates of job creation and job destruction. 
The one-year persistence rate of job creation is the fraction of jobs created in year t that William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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remain filled at the sampling date one year later. The one-year persistence rate of job 
destruction  is the fraction of jobs that do not reappear at the sampling date one year later 
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). Documenting these persistence rates tries to get at the 
question whether the observed job flows are of a temporary or more permanent nature,  
an issue of particular relevance in the transition context. 
The Amadeus data set is a sample and not the universe of all Ukrainian firms. 
Apart from micro firms, it is however a random sample of Ukrainian firms in the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Because the data are not census-type data, 
the presented job flow rates are estimates and it is, therefore, important to establish the 
precision of these estimates, i.e. to provide standard errors. One way to generate these 
standard errors, which is computer-intensive but computationally simple, is 
bootstrapping.
3 Since the sample is random this is a legitimate procedure, which thus far 
has been used very seldom in the literature on gross job flows in transition economies 
even when small random samples were analysed instead of census-type data.  
The large increase in trade flows to and from Western countries that Ukrainian 
manufacturing sectors have experienced since independence can be used as a quasi social 
experiment of the effect of trade liberalisation on employment in the liberalizing 
economy. Using trade flow and employment data at the sector level in manufacturing we 
construct the following index of the relative openness of a sector: 
 
Openj,t = [(Impj,t + Expj,t)/(Imptot,t + Exptot,t)]*(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96). 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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The index gives the relative share of imports and exports of sector j in year t, weighted by 
its employment share in 1996. The sector collection, purification and distribution of 
water, which has no trade ties, is excluded when constructing the index. We employ a 
smoothed version of this index, taking averages over the years 1996-1998, which also 
guarantees that the index is exogenous to the analysed gross job flows of the years 1999 
and 2000. The index is conceived to measure the relative degree, with which a respective 
sector in manufacturing industry has opened up to the world economy.
4 Ukraine as a part 
of the former Soviet Union has trade flows to and from countries within the CIS (mainly 
Russia) that were, of course, intra-country flows of goods before independence. A rise in 
CIS trade flows of a sector in manufacturing might reflect the re-establishment of 
previously existing trade links between enterprises, i.e. the attenuation of the problems of 
“disorganisation” discussed in the literature
5, or it might represent a genuine opening up 
of this sector.  We, therefore, construct the index for trade flows directed to and 
originating from all countries, CIS countries and finally where we net out the share of 
CIS trade flows. Looking at the link between relative openness of a sector and 
employment adjustment at the firm level across these three sets of trade flows we hope to 
shed some light on the nature of trade within the CIS and without.   
  
III. Basic Patterns of Job Creation and Destruction in Ukraine 
 
  Ukraine has been a “laggard” in the reform process and experienced an unabated 
fall in output and real wages throughout the nineties, as Figure 1 demonstrates. The path 
of employment in this figure is particularly interesting, showing a decline in employment 
far less dramatic than the decline in GDP: real GDP collapsed to roughly 41% of its level William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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in 1990, the year before Ukrainian independence, while employment amounted to 86% of 
its 1990-level in 1999.
6  Little rigorous work has been done on the Ukrainian labour 
market. We know, however, from aggregate data and casual evidence that, like in Russia, 
a precipitous fall in real wages, the wide spread practices of wage arrears and of unpaid 
leave have been dominant adjustment factors that can explain the very high levels of 
employment in a period of severe contraction.  Output stabilised only in 1999 according 
to Figure 1 and we observe in the year 2000 for the first time an increase in real GDP and 
simultaneously a drop in employment in the Ukrainian economy. So, for the first time in 
the year 2000 we seem to see a decrease of over-manning levels, which had been 
increasing in the first six years of the nineties over and above the already excessive levels 
at the beginning of the decade.  
  The precipitous fall in output that we can observe in Figure 1 has been very 
heterogeneous across sub-sectors of the Ukrainian economy. Figure 2 shows this for the 
manufacturing sector, which is disaggregated into 12 industries. While we observe a 
common decline in output over the years 1996-1999
7, the immense variation in output 
contraction is striking. While the industry “ferrous metals” contracts by 5% between 
1996 and 1999, the industries “chemicals” and “wood and paper” do so by more than 
70% over the same period. The fact that over-manning levels have increased in this 
period for all industries can be seen in Figure 3, where the employment levels either 
decline in a much more modest way than do output levels or actually increase. 
Consequently labour productivity is declining between 1996 and 1999 for all industries in 
manufacturing as can be seen in Figure 4, which also shows dramatic variation in this 
variable.  The sources of the fall in labour productivity and its variation are, however, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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twofold. A very large fall in the output of a domestic industry, brought on by the collapse 
of the demand for its products, can for political, social and economic reasons not be 
compensated by a similarly large fall in employment.
8  In other industries, output might 
not fall that much, but firms will hold on to labour since as a consequence of a collapsed 
real wage labour costs are extremely low and because they can engage in wage arrears 
and the sending of workers on forced unpaid leave with impunity. Both the first reason, 
which is of a compositional nature and the behavioural reason for the fall in labour 
productivity are present in the data.  In some industries output declines are very large and 
employment falls are substantial but smaller, for example in “wood and paper” and in 
“light industry.” In other industries output declines are more moderate, but employment 
stays virtually constant or rises as we can see in “ferrous metals” and “electricity.” 
  Table 1 presents the distributions of employment growth for various years using 
both the Amadeus and the Derzhkomstat data sets. For both 1999 and 2000 the mean 
growth rates are negative in the overall sample of the Amadeus data as in the sub-samples 
of manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The same holds for the four years of the 
growth rates derived from the Derzhkomstat data. For all years and both data sets we 
observe a zero growth rate at the 75 percentile. So, slightly less than three quarters of all 
firms destroy jobs, while roughly one quarter creates jobs in each year. The mean growth 
rates of the overall sample of the Amadeus data set are in both years with –0.061 and –
0.062 smaller than the (negative) growth rates implied by the employment levels in 
Figure 1, which amount roughly to –0.02. The lack of micro firms in the Amadeus data 
set might explain some of this discrepancy since these firms might contribute to job 
creation in a particularly strong fashion.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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  The distributions of employment growth based on the Derzhkomstat data are 
relatively compressed in the first three years for which we have data, in the year 2000 the 
distribution becomes more dispersed as shown in the increase of the standard deviation. 
We see a similar jump in the standard deviation between 1999 and 2000 with the 
Amadeus data set. In the case of the latter data set, the wider distribution in 
manufacturing is solely brought about because of higher levels of labour shedding, since 
at the 5 percentile, for example, the growth rate falls from –0.293 to –0.482. In non-
manufacturing the wider distribution is a result of both more labour shedding and of an 
increase in employment expansion by some firms, since at the 5th percentile we see a 
decrease in the growth rate from  -0.404 to –0.598 and an increase at the 95th percentile 
from 0.436 to 0.554 over the two years. So, heterogeneity in employment behaviour 
clearly increased in the year 2000. Since the non-manufacturing sector encompasses any 
branch of the economy outside manufacturing, we would expect more heterogeneity in 
the former sector. This expectation is confirmed by the larger dispersion of employment 
growth rates in non-manufacturing.       
  Inspection of the figures for the manufacturing sector for the years 1999 and 2000 
across the two data sets leads us to state that these distributions are “in the same 
ballpark.”  However, the employment growth distributions generated from the 
Derzhkomstat data are slightly displaced to the left in comparison with those generated 
with the Amadeus data since the growth rates based on the former data are smaller at both 
the 5
th and 90
th percentiles. The presence of 40 new private firms in the Amadeus 
manufacturing data might explain this better growth performance.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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  How do these employment growth distributions compare to other countries in the 
CIS, for example Russia? Brown and Earle (2002) present such distributions for 
traditional Russian manufacturing firms using Goskomstat census-type data. It is, 
therefore appropriate to compare the distributions based on the Derzhkomstat data. From 
the mid-nineties the Russian employment growth distributions show a dispersion that we 
observe in Ukraine only for the year 2000, again demonstrating the position of Ukraine as 
a “laggard” in economic reform.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the distributions of the growth rates for the manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing sectors using the Amadeus data. From the figures it is clear that 
there are only continuous firms in the data set. It is, therefore, difficult to directly 
compare these distributions to the distributions of employment growth rates in Western 
economies. Nevertheless, if we compare figures 5 and 6 to those presented in Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999), employment growth rates are much more compressed in Ukraine 
than in Western economies, even in the year 2000. Roughly 50 percent of all firms are in 
the interval [-0.153, 0] i.e. many firms contribute in a small fashion to the destruction of 
jobs. Also, whether we look at manufacturing or non-manufacturing a relatively large 
number of firms contributes to the creation of jobs as the concentration of probability 
mass close to the right of zero in figures 5 and 6 implies. It is also evident that the 
majority of firms is engaged in job destruction in Ukraine in the two years under analysis. 
In the U.S., on the other hand, a relatively small number of firms contribute massively to 
job destruction as well as job creation.   The different scenario in a transition economy 
where, like in Ukraine, reforms are very hesitant seems reasonable. In most industries, a 
majority of firms will shed labour and do this at a moderate rate, while a substantial William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
  16
minority of firms will expand employment. However, whether we deal with reallocation 
of labour within industries, which one might also call restructuring within industries, or 
reallocation of labour from declining to expanding industries can not be inferred from 
these figures.      
  In order to say something about restructuring within industries we need to look 
at job flow measures at a more disaggregated level. Tables A2 and A3 present estimates 
of the five standard job flow measures for various industries according to the NACE2 
classification in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing. These tables show the 
tremendous heterogeneity within the two sectors.  In the manufacturing sector we see 
only three industries with a positive net employment growth rate in 1999, while in 2000 
four industries add more jobs than they destroy. So, in both years job destruction clearly 
dominates employment adjustment in the Ukrainian manufacturing sector. The estimates 
of the excess job reallocation rates are especially interesting. They range from zero, 
where the industry engages either only in job destruction or only in job creation, to a 
value of 20% in 1999 and of 19% in 2000. These latter values indicate that up to one fifth 
of all jobs are reallocated within industries over a period of a year. While these values are 
clearly an upper bound there are many industries that reallocate between 5% and 10% of 
all jobs over a year and only a few that have either zero or very low restructuring levels. 
In other words, inspection of the estimates of the excess job reallocation rates leads us to 
conclude that most of the job reallocation occurs within sectors rather than between 
sectors.
9  In addition, these differences of the excess job reallocation that we observe 
across industries suggest that some structural characteristics of sectors, such as the degree William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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of competitive pressure, may have an impact on the degree of job reallocation between 
firms within the same sector.       
In the non-manufacturing sector similar patterns of job flows across industries can 
be observed in Table A3. Like in manufacturing, job destruction dominates, as does 
reallocation within sectors. The range of the estimates of the excess job reallocation rates 
in 1999 is the same as in manufacturing while in 2000 the upper bound is 8 percentage 
points higher. Sectors related to trade and education are industries that seem to be 
particularly affected by restructuring in this year when economic activity started to pick 
up for the first time in Ukraine. 
The job flow rates that we now present are virtually all estimates based on the 
Amadeus data set. There is only one table (Table 4) showing job flow measures of 
manufacturing based on the census-type Derzhkomstat data. In all the tables that are 
based on the Amadeus data we also report bootstrapped standard errors of the job flow 
measures. These standard errors, which are based on 1000 repetitions, allow us to 
establish the precision of the estimates and, using various distributional assumptions, 
enable us to construct confidence intervals and to thus compare job flow rates across 
categories in a statistically meaningful way. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals of 
the job flow measures are very similar whether one imposes a normal distribution or uses 
the percentile method.
10 For the purposes of the paper is suffices to double the shown 
standard error to get a pretty good approximation of half of the width of the confidence 
interval.  
Table 2 presents estimates of the job flow rates using the overall sample of the 
Amadeus data set, while Table 3 shows estimates of these rates and of gross job flow William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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shares and size shares after the data set has been split into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. While job destruction dominates job creation in the Ukrainian economy 
in both years, job creation rises and job destruction falls in 2000 compared with 1999. As 
already stated heterogeneity in employment behaviour increased in 2000 as shown by the 
doubling of the excess job reallocation rate. In addition, given the bootstrapping 
procedure, the increase in the bootstrap standard errors from 1999 to 2000 for all job flow 
measures apart from the job destruction rate tells us that job creation has become more 
heterogeneous in 2000 and not job destruction.
11  
The manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors have very similar job flow 
measures in 1999. In the year 2000, on the other hand, there seem to be clear differences 
between the two sectors of the economy, as job creation is more than double in the non-
manufacturing sector. We can, however, also see that the rise in heterogeneous 
employment behaviour in 2000 can be mainly attributed to the non-manufacturing sector, 
which makes the estimates in this sector much more imprecise than in manufacturing. 
The large standard error in the job creation rate does not allow us to unequivocally say 
that non-manufacturing has a larger job creation in the year 2000 than manufacturing. We 
can say, however, that non-manufacturing contributes disproportionately to job creation 
in both years, while its destruction shares are only marginally higher than its size shares. 
This sector seems to be in a steady state in the year 2000, as the job creation rate roughly 
equals the job destruction rate. Given the large standard errors on both pos and net, it 
might be hard to maintain this assertion. Also, since the Ukrainian economy seems to 
have come out a deep depression only in the year 2000, there is little reason to believe William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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that the non-manufacturing sector of the economy has already reached a steady state in 
that year.  
The estimates of the job flow rates of the manufacturing sector are clearly more 
precise. The 95% confidence intervals of all the job flow rates in manufacturing given in 
Table 3 include the values in Table 4, where we report the same measures using the 
Derzkomstat census data. The upshot of this discussion has to be that while there seems 
to be more job creation in the non-manufacturing sector, one needs to be careful when 
interpreting numbers generated from our Amadeus sample.  That the non-manufacturing 
sector is more heterogeneous in its employment behaviour than the manufacturing sector 
only in the year 2000 is a very interesting finding that seems to locate the beginning of 
the restructuring process in Ukraine in that year. This restructuring is however rather 
modest in international perspective since a 14% reallocation rate (Table 2) is definitely at 
the lower end of the range of reallocation rates found in studies on gross job flows in 
Western economies, which are summarised in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). Compared 
with other transition countries the job reallocation rate is also small. For example, 
Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) report a rate of 22.5% for Polish Manufacturing 
in 1991, while Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2000) a rate of 22.6% for the Estonian 
economy during the early period of transition.  
Splicing the data by size and ownership type, we see some interesting patterns. 
The size categories for manufacturing and non-manufacturing in Tables 5 and 6 are not 
identical since in the former sector employment levels are larger. The smallest size 
categories in manufacturing and non-manufacturing have an upper bound of 300 
employees and of 250 employees respectively to ensure that we get enough observations William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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with these smallest size categories. Even though, we do observe in both sectors that, at 
least in 1999, the smallest size categories have far larger job creation rates than the other 
size categories hinting at an inverse relationship between job creation and size. Since job 
destruction does not show such a clear pattern in 1999, the net employment growth rates 
in both sectors are also inversely related to size in that year. These patterns do not hold in 
the year 2000. We get an inconsistent picture of the correlation of size and gross job 
flows, so there is no apparent inverse relationship of size and net employment growth 
rates. However, in both years we observe more heterogeneous employment behaviour in 
the smallest size categories as shown by the larger excess job reallocation rates.  
A comparison of the shares of job creation and destruction with the employment 
size shares gives a rather inconsistent picture. In 1999 small firms contribute dramatically 
to job creation in both sectors, while job destruction is proportional to their size. In 
contrast, in the year 2000 small firms have job creation shares that are only marginally 
larger than their size shares, while the shares of job destruction are roughly double their 
size shares. Similar inconsistent patterns one observes with very large firms. In the year 
1999 the contribution to job creation is disproportionately small in both sectors, but in 
proportion to their size shares in 2000. The contributions of the middle-sized firms to job 
creation are roughly in line with their employment sizes, while in six out of eight cases 
job destruction is disproportionately large.   
In spite of a somewhat inconsistent picture, small firms in Ukraine seem to 
contribute more to job creation than we observe in Western economies. But this size 
effect could be closely connected to firm age or ownership type: young firms and new 
private firms tend to have small employment levels. While there is unfortunately no William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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reliable information on the age of the firm, we can condition on ownership type and see 
whether the size effect is partially explained by composition effects. Table 7 presents the 
five job flow measures and the three share statistics for the overall sample disaggregated 
by three ownership types, privatised, new private and state-owned firms. There are 
striking differences with respect to job creation between, on the one hand, new private 
firms and privatised and state-owned firms, on the other hand. New private firms are 
much more dynamic as far as job creation is concerned, leading to positive employment 
growth in both years. We also observe more heterogeneity in the employment behaviour 
of new private firms as shown by the much higher excess job reallocation rate in both 
years. In particular privatised firms but also state-owned ones predominantly destroy 
jobs, while new private firms both create and destroy jobs, findings that were also 
established for the Russian economy (Acquisti and Lehmann, 2000). The good job 
creation performance of new private firms in both years implies that there is a genuine 
ownership type effect at work and not just a size effect, since small firms performed 
poorly but new private firms did well in 2000. Below we will try to disentangle these size 
and ownership effects properly within a regression framework.              
New private firms contribute a disproportionately large amount of jobs to the pool 
of new jobs, while their contribution to job destruction corresponds roughly to their 
employment share. It is striking that state-owned firms outperform privatised firms on 
these measures, i.e. relative to their employment share privatised firms create smaller 
amounts of new jobs and destroy more jobs than do state-owned firms. This result could 
be an indication that privatised firms engage in some “initial restructuring”, i.e. they have 
started the process of slowly eliminating over-manning levels.  This picture of job flows William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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and job creation and destruction shares is not altered when we look at the two sectors 
individually as inspection of Tables 8 and 9 shows. 
The final dimension that we want to look at is trade orientation. How the opening 
up of an economy to world trade affects job creation and job destruction in the domestic 
labour market is an interesting question that has been relatively little explored, mainly 
because of a lack of adequate data.
12  Transition economies that are at the beginning of 
the reform process like e.g. Ukraine in the reported period provide something close to a 
natural experiment, which allows us to pursue this question empirically. In a first step we 
look at the correlation between job flows and shares of the industries in the traded sector 
and the relative degree of openness of the industry, in which the firm operates. We, 
therefore, divide firms into three groups, those operating in an industry located in the 
lowest third of the distribution of the relative openness index (“low”), those operating in 
an industry located in the middle third (“medium”), and finally those operating in an 
industry located in the top third of the distribution (“high”). 
Table 10 shows job flow and share measures according to these three sets of firms 
and related to the three geographical areas of trade flows mentioned in the previous 
section.  For 1999 the results are quite striking. Firms being active in industries that are 
relatively closed have higher job creation rates and lower job destruction rates than firms 
in more open industries, leading to a substantially larger negative growth rate, i.e. less 
labour shedding, in the more closed sector. However, the entries for the year 2000 
suggest a non-monotonic relationship between relative openness and labour shedding, as 
firms in industries that are in the medium tercile of the distribution of the index decrease 
employment more than other firms.  The evidence from these cross tabulations, therefore, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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does not establish a clear link between the degree of openness of a sector and 
employment adjustment of firms operating in that sector. 
The correlations between relative openness and employment adjustment do not 
exhibit any statistically significant differences across the various indices that are based on 
trade within three different geographic areas. In particular, on this evidence Ukrainian 
trade flows within the CIS and outside this area seem to generate similar patterns of job 
flows. However, the regression analysis undertaken below might shed more light on the 
impact of relative openness on firm-level employment adjustment and on the nature of 
trade flows in the CIS area and outside this area.  
The one-year persistence rates of annual job flows in Table 11 clearly 
demonstrate that these flows are not of a temporary nature. Roughly 80% of jobs created 
in 1999 are still there one year later, and about 90% of all jobs destroyed in 1999 do not 
reappear in 2000. Both these rates are roughly 10 percentage points higher than those 
presented for the U.S. by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).  Different persistence patterns 
emerge in the two sectors of the economy. Creation and destruction persistence are equal 
and roughly 85% in manufacturing, while in non-manufacturing the destruction 
persistence is with 92% roughly 20 percentage points higher than the persistence of 
created jobs. Surprisingly the non-manufacturing sector has the higher destruction 
persistence. Compared to Russian manufacturing firms (s. Brown and Earle, 2002), their 
Ukrainian counterparts seem to have lower destruction and higher creation persistence 
rates, hinting at less volatility in job flows of the Ukrainian manufacturing sector. 
We also find that in both sectors small firms have far lower one-year persistence 
rates in destruction than larger firms. This relationship is particularly striking in non-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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manufacturing, where the persistence rate in destruction of small firms is more than 30 
percentage points lower. Small firms seem to be more able to recover lost jobs within a 
short period of time. On the other hand, when the sample is spliced on ownership type 
there are no statistically significant differences in the persistence rates across categories.
 
13 Finally, firms operating in sectors with a medium degree of openness have higher 
creation and destruction persistence rates than firms in sectors with a different trade 
regime, pointing to more volatility of job flows at the tails of the openness distribution 
(Table 12).     
  
IV. Employment Growth, Job Reallocation and Excess Job Reallocation 
 
  The gross job flow rates that we documented in the last section are ultimately linked to 
the individual firm’s employment decision. Factors that influence firm level employment 
will most likely also shape the pattern of gross job flows in the aggregate. We therefore 
explore in this section what factors drive firm level employment decisions, taking into 
account some of the issues that we addressed in the previous section. For instance, we 
could not establish unequivocally whether high job creation rates in new private firms are 
driven by the fact that they are also typically small. So, we may want to disentangle the 
effects of ownership and size to establish the importance of ownership for the job 
generation process. 
  We pool the two years of data and first estimate an employment growth equation of 
the form: 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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git = β0 + β1ln(size)it + β2newprivatei + β3privatisedi + β4∑jI(ij)ln(avgop)j + ∑jδijinddumj 
+ εit  ,               ( 1 )  
 
where  size is average contemporaneous size, avgop  is the relative openness index 
averaged over the years 1996-1998, newprivate and privatised are ownership dummies, 
while inddum  is an industry dummy. The indicator variable I(ij) takes the value one 
when firm i is in industry j, while εit is a heteroscedastic random error. Since ownership 
changes in the sampled firms occurred no later than 1996 and since we have taken the 
average of the openness index over the years 1996-1998, the ownership dummies and the 
openness index are by construction not correlated with the error term. For the moment we 
also follow the firm growth literature in assuming that average size is weakly 
exogeneous. Consequently, as long as this latter assumption holds equation (1) is 
consistently estimated with OLS. 
  The negative relationship between firm size and gross flows of jobs is confirmed for 
firm level employment flows in the case of the entire sample and in the case of non-
manufacturing as columns 1 and 2 in Table 13 show. Since a significant correlation of 
size and growth is not found for manufacturing, firm size alone is an important factor that 
can explain differences in turbulence or gross flows of jobs between the manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing sector.    
  Controlling for size, new private firms have much higher growth rates than firms in 
the other two ownership classes, state-owned and privatised firms. While survival bias 
might play a role here, work on firm level growth equations done for market economies 
and also for emerging economies has established that a lot of potential selection bias is William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
  26
being picked up by including size of the firm in the regression (e.g. Evans, 1987; Konings 
and Xavier, 2001). While new private firms have higher average growth rates in the 
manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector, it is also noteworthy that 
privatised firms have the same employment growth as have state-owned firms. Such a 
finding was established by Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) for Polish 
manufacturing and by Richter and Schaffer (1996) for Russian manufacturing at the start 
of transition. In contrast, Brown and Earle (2002) find a small positive effect of 
privatisation on employment growth in the Russian manufacturing sector. Our result 
would suggest that in Ukraine privatisation had thus far no effect on the employment 
behaviour of firms.   
  Columns 4-6 of Table 13 include relative openness at the sector level as a covariate in 
the regression for the manufacturing (traded) sector, covering the world, CIS countries 
and non-CIS countries as the three trading areas. Firms that operate in sectors that are 
relatively open to non-CIS trade, i.e. to trade predominantly with Western countries, 
engage in more labour shedding, while relative openness of a sector in the CIS trading 
area has no impact on employment firm growth.  On this evidence it appears that trade 
with non-CIS countries exerts more pressure on employment policies of firms than when 
trade is directed towards the CIS.   Regressing the modulus of the firm level growth 
rate on the covariates of equation (1), we also estimate job reallocation at the firm level 
using the same specifications as in the employment growth regression. The results of 
Table 14 show that smaller firms engage in more job reallocation, whether we analyse the 
whole sample or the two sectors separately. Also, in the manufacturing sector new private 
firms reallocate more jobs than state-owned firms, while privatised firms belonging to the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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non-manufacturing sector have a lower job reallocation rate than state firms. The latter 
finding has also been established by Brown and Earle (2002) for Russia, however in the 
manufacturing sector. Finally, firms in a relative open sector engage in more job 
reallocation when trade is directed towards non-CIS countries while a strong negative 
relationship seems to prevail between openness of a sector and job reallocation at the firm 
level when trade is in the CIS area.   
  Estimates of the effects of the considered covariates on the excess job reallocation rate 
are shown in Table 15. These estimates are derived by subtracting the coefficient of the 
firm-level reallocation model from the absolute value of the coefficient of the 
employment growth model. If we take the results as evidence on restructuring at the firm 
level, the following picture emerges. Larger firms restructure less in both sectors, 
although in non-manufacturing the negative impact of size on restructuring is roughly 
three times stronger. New private firms engage in less excess job reallocation than do 
state-owned and privatised firms, which implies that most of the strong firm level 
reallocation of new private firms observed in Table 14 is due to the tremendous growth in 
employment. Particularly interesting is the effect of relative openness on firm level 
restructuring. Firms operating in sectors that have strong trade ties in the CIS restructure 
less than those with weaker ties, while there is a positive, albeit small effect of relative 
openness on firm level restructuring where trade flows in non-CIS countries are 
concerned. Firms operating in sectors that have strong trade ties with CIS economies 
seem to encounter relatively little pressure to restructure, while trade with the West 
imposes some discipline on firms.                William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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V. Conclusions 
This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in Ukraine. 
To this end we use a unique data set of more than 2200 Ukrainian firms operating in both 
the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector for the years 1998-2000. 
There are several important findings in the paper. First, job destruction is dominating 
job creation in both 1999 and 2000, with destruction rates of 11% in 1999 and of 8% in 
2000, while the creation rates are 3% and 6% respectively. This result and the analysis of 
aggregate data of GDP and employment lead us to believe that the Ukrainian economy is 
still at an early phase of restructuring and transition. The most clear-cut result is the 
strong positive effect of new private firms on net employment growth, a finding 
established for other transition economies as well. At the same time, we do not find 
differences in the employment growth of state-owned and privatised firms. We also 
observe an inverse relationship between size of a firm and net employment growth at the 
firm level in non-manufacturing. An inverse correlation between size and the firm-level 
reallocation rate is, however, present in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing.  A 
fourth finding is the substantial heterogeneity in job flows in our sample as a result of 
large differences in employment behaviour within and across narrowly defined industries. 
Finally, firms located in industries with strong foreign trade links to Western economies 
seem to experience some pressure to downsize their workforce and to restructure more 
vigorously than firms with weaker links. However, the relative openness of a sector, in 
which a firm operates, has no predictive power with respect to firm employment growth 
and is negatively correlated with job reallocation when foreign trade is within CIS William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
  29
countries. Trade links seem to have a disciplining function when firms are in industries 
that trade with Western economies; this function seems absent when firms operate in 
industries that trade with CIS countries.     William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Figure 1 – GDP, Employment and Real Wage Dynamics in Ukraine: 1990 - 2000 
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Figure 2 - Production in Ukrainian Industrial Sectors, 1996-1999 
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Figure 3 - Employment in Ukrainian Industrial Sectors, 1996-2000 
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Figure 4 - Labor Productivity in Ukrainian Industrial Sectors, 1996-1999 
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Figure 4 - Distribution of Growth Rates in Manufacturing in 1999 and 2000 
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Figure 5 - Distribution of Growth Rates in Non-manufacturing in 1999 and 2000 
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Table 1 - Distribution of Year-by-Year Employment Growth Rates 
 
Source  Year    1%  5%  10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%  Mean    StDev
Amadeus 98-99  -0.665  -0.341 -0.241 -0.158 -0.092 0.002 0.163 0.342 0.851 -0.061 0.254
overall sample 
n=2239 99-2000  -1.013  -0.518 -0.333 -0.153 -0.040 0.025 0.137 0.315 1.137 -0.062 0.307
Amadeus 98-99  -0.582  -0.293 -0.230 -0.155 -0.094 -0.011 0.111 0.269 0.800 -0.065 0.216
manufacturing 
n=1259 99-2000  -0.974  -0.482 -0.308 -0.138 -0.036 0.024 0.100 0.194 0.763 -0.073 0.248
Amadeus 98-99  -0.942  -0.404 -0.262 -0.161 -0.088 0.023 0.225 0.436 0.885 -0.055 0.296
non-
manufacturing 
n=980 99-2000  -1.122  -0.598 -0.346 -0.167 -0.044 0.028 0.240 0.554 1.376 -0.048 0.369
Derzhkomstat 96-97  -0.621  -0.308 -0.234 -0.144 -0.070 0.000 0.061 0.126 0.475 -0.078 0.185
manufacturing 97-98 -0.744  -0.321 -0.229 -0.130 -0.055 0.005 0.075 0.143 0.529 -0.065 0.197
 n=6189  98-99  -0.748 -0.339 -0.248 -0.141 -0.058 0.005 0.080 0.163 0.477 -0.072 0.196
   99-2000 -1.126 -0.537 -0.340 -0.168 -0.056 0.022 0.102 0.192 0.503 -0.098 0.264
  
96-2000 
Average -0.810 -0.376 -0.262 -0.146 -0.060 0.008 0.079 0.156 0.496 -0.078 0.211William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Table 2 – Gross Flow Rates for Overall Sample 
 
Year pos  neg  gross  net  exc n 
1999  0.026 0.109 0.135 -0.083 0.052 2239 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)   
2000  0.059 0.081 0.140 -0.022 0.118 2239 
  (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.019) (0.028)   
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions.  
Source: Amadeus data set 
 
 
Table 3 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Sector: 1999 and 2000 
 
Year Sector  pos  neg  gross net  exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh  n 
1999 Manufacturing  0.020  0.104 0.124 -0.084 0.040 0.573 0.608  0.637 1259
    (0.003)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)     
1999 Non-  0.031  0.118 0.149 -0.087 0.062 0.427 0.392  0.363  980
  manufacturing  (0.007)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013)     
2000 Manufacturing  0.040  0.073 0.113 -0.033 0.080 0.431 0.571  0.635 1259
    (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)     
2000 Non-  0.092  0.095 0.187 -0.003 0.184 0.569 0.429  0.365  980
  manufacturing  (0.048)  (0.015) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048)     
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; jcsh, jdsh and szsh denote 
share in job creation, job destruction and size share respectively. 
Source: Amadeus data set 
 
 
Table 4 - Gross Job Flows in Manufacturing – Census-type Derzhkomstat Data 
 
Year pos  neg  gross  net  exc n 
1997  0.016 0.099 0.115 -0.083 0.032 6189 
1998  0.020 0.081 0.101 -0.061 0.040 6189 
1999  0.021 0.079 0.100 -0.058 0.042 6189 
2000  0.034 0.079 0.113 -0.045 0.068 6189 
Source: Ukrainian Statistical Office – Derzhkomstat 
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Table 5 – Job Flow Rates and Shares in Manufacturing by Size Category 
 
Year  Size  pos  neg  gross  net  exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh n 
1999 size≤300  0.095  0.087 0.182 0.008 0.174 0.134 0.027 0.033 193
    (0.017)  (0.007) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)      
1999 300<size≤500  0.038  0.110 0.148 -0.072 0.076 0.183 0.118 0.112 415
    (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)      
1999 500<size≤1000  0.032  0.118 0.150 -0.086 0.064 0.216 0.180 0.159 332
    (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)      
1999  size>1000  0.016  0.101 0.117 -0.085 0.032 0.467 0.674 0.696 319
    (0.004)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)      
2000 Size≤300  0.048  0.152 0.200 -0.104 0.096 0.056 0.100 0.048 261
    (0.009)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)      
2000 300<size≤500  0.032  0.121 0.153 -0.089 0.064 0.091 0.192 0.116 403
    (0.005)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018)      
2000 500<size≤1000  0.048  0.101 0.149 -0.053 0.096 0.177 0.210 0.151 295
    (0.009)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017)      
2000  size>1000  0.040  0.053 0.093 -0.013 0.080 0.675 0.498 0.686 300
    (0.010)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)      
Note: see Table 2 
Source: Amadeus data set 
 
 
Table 6 – Job Flow Rates and Shares in Non-manufacturing by Size Category 
 
Year Size  pos  neg  gross  net  exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh  n 
1999 size≤250  0.188  0.074 0.262  0.114 0.148 0.207 0.021 0.034 178
   (0.023)  (0.011) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022)        
1999 250<size≤400  0.038  0.122 0.160  -0.084 0.076 0.176 0.145 0.140 359
   (0.006)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)        
1999 400<size≤650  0.028  0.139 0.167  -0.111 0.056 0.129 0.165 0.140 227
   (0.006)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)        
1999  size>650  0.022  0.115 0.137  -0.093 0.044 0.489 0.670 0.687 216
   (0.008)  (0.031) (0.036) (0.028) (0.015)        
2000 size≤250  0.134  0.192 0.326  -0.058 0.268 0.070 0.098 0.048 208
   (0.022)  (0.017) (0.023) (0.032) (0.042)        
2000 250<size≤400  0.061  0.126 0.187  -0.065 0.122 0.097 0.195 0.147 370
   (0.011)  (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.042)        
2000 400<size≤650  0.069  0.107 0.176  -0.038 0.138 0.098 0.148 0.131 207
   (0.014)  (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027)        
2000  size>650  0.101  0.079 0.180  0.022 0.158 0.735 0.560 0.674 195
   (0.071)  (0.021) (0.071) (0.078) (0.052)        
Note: see Table 2 
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Table 7 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Ownership Type – Overall Sample 
 
Year 
Ownership 
type pos  neg  gross  net  exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh  n 
1999  Privatised 0.023 0.119 0.142 -0.096 0.046  0.503 0.619  0.567  1413
   (0.003)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)     
1999  New  Private  0.192 0.069 0.261 0.123 0.138  0.139 0.012  0.019  132 
   (0.027)  (0.020) (0.030) (0.036) (0.040)     
1999  State  0.022 0.097 0.119 -0.075 0.044  0.356 0.366  0.413  685 
   (0.005)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011)     
2000  Privatised 0.049 0.089 0.138 -0.040 0.098  0.461 0.612  0.558  1413
   (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)     
2000  New  private  0.159 0.134 0.293 0.025 0.268  0.057 0.035  0.021  132 
   (0.031)  (0.028) (0.034) (0.048) (0.044)     
2000  State  0.068 0.067 0.135 0.001 0.134  0.482 0.350  0.419  685 
   (0.040)  (0.010) (0.040) (0.044) (0.039)     
Note: See Table 2 
Source: Amadeus data set 
 
Table 8 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Ownership Type – Manufacturing 
 
Year 
Ownership 
type pos  neg  gross  net  exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh  n 
1999  Privatised 0.019 0.114 0.133 -0.095 0.038  0.566 0.771  0.705  902 
   (0.003)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)     
1999  New  private  0.273 0.077 0.350 0.196 0.154  0.122 0.008  0.010 40 
   (0.068)  (0.025) (0.061) (0.083) (0.050)     
1999  State  0.025 0.081 0.106 -0.056 0.050  0.308 0.221  0.283  311 
   (0.008)  (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)     
2000  Privatised 0.042 0.076 0.118 -0.034 0.084  0.728 0.730  0.699  902 
   (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017)     
2000  New  private  0.191 0.140 0.331 0.051 0.280  0.059 0.024  0.012 40 
   (0.055)  (0.049) (0.057) (0.088) (0.075)     
2000  State  0.030 0.062 0.092 -0.032 0.060  0.213 0.244  0.286  311 
   (0.006)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012)     
Note: See Table 2 
Source: Amadeus data set 
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Table 9 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Ownership Type – Non-manufacturing 
 
Year 
Ownership 
type pos  neg  gross  net  exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh  n 
1999  Privatised 0.039 0.140 0.179 -0.101 0.078  0.419 0.385  0.325  511 
   (0.005)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)     
1999  New  private  0.148 0.065 0.213 0.083 0.130  0.161 0.018  0.033 92 
   (0.020)  (0.026) (0.030) (0.036) (0.051)     
1999  State  0.020 0.109 0.129 -0.089 0.040  0.420 0.592  0.641  374 
   (0.007)  (0.032) (0.036) (0.029) (0.015)     
2000  Privatised 0.077 0.139 0.216 -0.062 0.154  0.259 0.457  0.313  511 
   (0.013)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)     
2000  New  private  0.140 0.131 0.271 0.009 0.262  0.055 0.050  0.037 92 
   (0.037)  (0.035) (0.042) (0.059) (0.050)     
2000  State  0.098 0.072 0.170 0.026 0.144  0.685 0.490  0.650  374 
   (0.074)  (0.018) (0.073) (0.079) (0.050)     
Note: See Table 2 
Source: Amadeus data set 
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Table 10 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Relative Openness of Industrial Sector in 
Manufacturing and by Geographic Area of Trade Flows 
 
Year 
Trade 
openness pos  neg  gross net exc  jcsh jdsh  szsh  n 
1999 Low  (All)  0.050  0.063 0.112 -0.013 0.099 0.186 0.053  0.087  175 
    (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015)     
1999 Medium (All)  0.032  0.123 0.155 -0.092 0.062 0.398 0.352 0.297  383 
    (0.007)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014)     
1999 High  (All)  0.016 0.101 0.117 -0.085 0.032 0.416 0.596  0.615  701 
    (0.003)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)     
1999 Low  (CIS)  0.061 0.086 0.147 -0.025 0.122 0.284 0.089  0.108  224 
    (0.009)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.016)     
1999 Medium (CIS)  0.025  0.119 0.144 -0.093 0.051 0.300 0.315 0.277  334 
    (0.007)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015)     
1999 High  (CIS)  0.016 0.101 0.117 -0.085 0.032 0.416 0.596  0.615 701 
    (0.003)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)     
1999 Low   0.050  0.063 0.112 -0.013 0.099 0.186 0.053  0.087  175 
  (non-CIS)  (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015)     
1999 Medium   0.030  0.122 0.152 -0.093 0.059 0.385 0.357  0.304  389 
  (non-CIS)  (0.007)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014)     
1999 High   0.016  0.101 0.118 -0.085 0.033 0.429 0.591  0.609  695 
  (non-CIS)  (0.003)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)     
2000 Low  (All)  0.054  0.092 0.146 -0.038 0.108 0.121 0.114  0.090  175 
    (0.011)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)     
2000 Medium (All)  0.026  0.091 0.117 -0.064 0.053 0.191 0.363 0.291  383 
    (0.005)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011)     
2000 High  (All)  0.045 0.061 0.106 -0.016 0.090 0.689 0.522  0.619  701 
    (0.010)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)     
2000 Low  (CIS)  0.046 0.084 0.130 -0.039 0.091 0.125 0.129  0.111  224 
    (0.009)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)     
2000 Medium (CIS)  0.028  0.094 0.121 -0.066 0.055 0.186 0.349 0.270  334 
    (0.006)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)     
2000 High  (CIS)  0.045 0.061 0.106 -0.016 0.090 0.689 0.522  0.619 701 
    (0.010)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)     
2000 Low   0.054  0.092 0.146 -0.038 0.108 0.121 0.114  0.090  175 
  (non-CIS)  (0.011)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)     
2000 Medium   0.026  0.087 0.113 -0.061 0.052 0.193 0.355  0.298  389 
  (non-CIS)  (0.005)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010)     
2000 High   0.045  0.063 0.108 -0.018 0.091 0.687 0.531  0.612  695 
  (non-CIS)  (0.010)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)     
Note: See Table 2. All=trade to all countries; CIS=trade to CIS economies; non-CIS=trade to 
complement of CIS countries. 
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Table 11 – One-Year Persistence Rates for Annual Job Flows: 
Overall Sample and by Sector 
 
Category jcpers  jdpers 
Overall sample  0.804  0.886 
 (0.023)  (0.023) 
Sector jcpers  jdpers 
Manufacturing 0.852  0.861 
 (0.023)  (0.034) 
Non-manufacturing 0.740  0.926 
 (0.039)  (0.020) 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, 
based on 1000 repetitions. 
Source: Amadeus data set 
 
Table 12 – One-Year Persistence Rates for Annual Job Flows: 
By Trade Orientation in Manufacturing 
 
Trade orientation  jcpers  jdpers 
Low (All)  0.784  0.823 
 (0.077)  (0.035) 
Medium (All)  0.906  0.937 
 (0.025)  (0.014) 
High (All)  0.832  0.819 
 (0.033)  (0.051) 
Low (CIS)  0.833  0.906 
 (0.053)  (0.032) 
Medium (CIS)  0.899  0.927 
 (0.035)  (0.015) 
High (CIS)  0.832  0.819 
 (0.033)  (0.050) 
Low (non- CIS)  0.784  0.823 
 (0.070)  (0.034) 
Medium (non- CIS)  0.903  0.938 
 (0.024)  (0.015) 
High (non- CIS)  0.837  0.817 
 (0.032)  (0.052) 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, 
based on 1000 repetitions.  
All=trade to all countries; CIS=trade to CIS 
economies;  
non-CIS=trade to complement of CIS countries. 
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Table 13 – Estimates of Firm Level Net Employment Growth Rate (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
 
Regressor total  sample  non-
manufacturing 
manufacturing manufacturing 
trade-all  
manufacturing 
trade-CIS 
manufacturing 
trade-not CIS 
ln(size) -0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.045*** 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
New 
private 
0.139*** 
(0.030) 
0.086** 
(0.037) 
0.219*** 
(0.053) 
0.219*** 
(0.053) 
0.219*** 
(0.053) 
0.219*** 
(0.053) 
Privatised -0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
Relative 
Openness 
– – –  -0.019** 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.028) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
R
2  0.047 0.051 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 
N  4484 1994 2490 2490 2490 2490 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) 
significance level. All regressions include 2-digit sector dummies.  
Source: Amadeus data set William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Table 14 – Estimates of Firm Level Employment Reallocation Rate (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
 
Regressor total  sample  non-
manufacturing 
manufacturing manufacturing 
trade-all  
manufacturing 
trade-CIS 
manufacturing 
trade-not CIS 
ln(size) -0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
New 
private 
0.036 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
0.131*** 
(0.042) 
0.131*** 
(0.042) 
0.131*** 
(0.042) 
0.131*** 
(0.042) 
Privatised -0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Relative 
Openness 
– – –  0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.041** 
(0.019) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
R
2  0.056 0.040 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
N  4484 1994 2490 2490 2490 2490 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regressions 
include 2-digit sector dummies.  
Source: Amadeus data set 
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Table 15 – Estimates of Firm Level Excess Job Reallocation Rate 
 
Regressor total  sample  non-
manufacturing 
manufacturing manufacturing 
trade-all  
manufacturing 
trade-CIS 
manufacturing 
trade-not CIS 
ln  (size)  -0.039  -0.067 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
New private  -0.139  -0.086 -0.088 -0.088 -0.088 -0.088 
Privatised  -0.016  -0.027  0 0 0 0 
Relative 
Openness 
– –  –  0  -0.041  0.001 
Note: Estimates are based on coefficients of tables 12 and 13. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Amadeus Firms 
  number of firms mean employment  mean employment 
growth 
year  1999  2000  1999 2000 1999 2000 
overall sample  2239  2239  968 
(3745) 
947 
(3928) 
-0.061 
(0.25) 
-0.062 
(0.31) 
manufacturing 1259  1259  1098 
(2521) 
1063 
(2708) 
-0.065 
(0.22) 
-0.073 
(0.25) 
non-manufacturing 980  980  800 
(4883) 
798 
(5081) 
-0.055 
(0.30) 
-0.048 
(0.37) 
Note: Standard deviation in brackets 
 
Table A2 - Job Flows by Industrial Sector in Manufacturing 
 
year nace2  industry pos  neg  gross  net  exc  n 
1999  10  Mining of coal and lignite  0.007 0.172 0.179 -0.165 0.014  7 
1999  15  Manufacture of food products and beverages  0.045 0.113 0.158 -0.068 0.089  295
1999  16  Manufacture of tobacco products  0.278 0.000 0.278  0.278  0.000  1 
1999 17  Manufacture  of  textiles  0.032 0.136 0.168  -0.104  0.063  45
1999 18 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur  0.089 0.163 0.252 -0.074 0.177  59
1999  19  Manufacture of leather and leather products  0.022 0.121 0.143 -0.099 0.044  26
1999  20  Manufacture of wood and wood products  0.078 0.094 0.173 -0.016 0.157  17
1999  21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  0.013 0.090 0.104 -0.077 0.027  10
1999 22 
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded 
media 0.033 0.106 0.139  -0.072  0.067  17
1999 23 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel  0.023 0.084 0.107 -0.060 0.047  15
1999  24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.015 0.121 0.136 -0.105 0.031  38
1999  25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  0.000 0.175 0.175 -0.175 0.000  12
1999 26 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 0.013 0.108 0.121  -0.094  0.027  92
1999  27  Manufacture of basic metals  0.009 0.083 0.092 -0.073 0.019  42
1999  28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products  0.006 0.076 0.082 -0.070 0.012  42
1999  29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  0.007 0.104 0.111 -0.097 0.014  181
1999  30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers 0.027 0.094 0.121 -0.067 0.053  3 
1999 31 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.  0.016 0.124 0.140 -0.108 0.032  51
1999 32 
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus  0.000 0.137 0.138 -0.137 0.001  25
1999 33 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks  0.006 0.177 0.183 -0.171 0.012  21
1999 34 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers  0.006 0.115 0.121 -0.109 0.011  24
1999  35  Manufacture of other transport equipment  0.013 0.106 0.119 -0.094 0.026  45William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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1999  36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  0.060 0.086 0.146 -0.026 0.120  37
1999  37  Recycling  0.172 0.099 0.272 0.073 0.199  9 
1999  40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  0.052 0.111 0.163 -0.059 0.105  90
1999  41  Collection, purification and distribution of water 0.048 0.022 0.070  0.026  0.043  55
2000  10  Mining of coal and lignite  0.000 0.273 0.273 -0.273 0.000  7 
2000  15  Manufacture of food products and beverages  0.049 0.082 0.131 -0.033 0.098  295
2000  16  Manufacture of tobacco products  0.000 0.036 0.036 -0.036 0.000  1 
2000 17  Manufacture  of  textiles  0.025 0.153 0.178  -0.127  0.051  45
2000 18 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur  0.029 0.046 0.075 -0.017 0.058  59
2000  19  Manufacture of leather and leather products  0.067 0.111 0.177 -0.044 0.134  26
2000  20  Manufacture of wood and wood products  0.056 0.208 0.264 -0.153 0.112  17
2000  21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  0.097 0.028 0.125  0.069  0.056  10
2000 22 
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded 
media 0.043 0.052 0.095  -0.010  0.086  17
2000 23 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel  0.043 0.042 0.085 0.001 0.084 15
2000  24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.030 0.087 0.118 -0.057 0.061  38
2000  25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  0.007 0.132 0.139 -0.125 0.014  12
2000 26 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 0.026 0.096 0.122  -0.070  0.052  92
2000  27  Manufacture of basic metals  0.079 0.018 0.096  0.061  0.036  42
2000  28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products  0.032 0.053 0.085 -0.021 0.064  42
2000  29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  0.017 0.091 0.109 -0.074 0.035  181
2000  30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers 0.096 0.631 0.727 -0.535 0.192  3 
2000 31 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.  0.022 0.100 0.122 -0.078 0.044  51
2000 32 
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus  0.009 0.140 0.149 -0.132 0.018  25
2000 33 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks  0.017 0.148 0.165 -0.131 0.035  21
2000 34 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers  0.010 0.220 0.230 -0.209 0.020  24
2000  35  Manufacture of other transport equipment  0.023 0.036 0.058 -0.013 0.046  45
2000  36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  0.051 0.102 0.153 -0.051 0.102  37
2000  37  Recycling  0.250 0.057 0.307 0.193 0.114  9 
2000  40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  0.035 0.030 0.065  0.005  0.060  90
2000  41  Collection, purification and distribution of water 0.028 0.069 0.097 -0.041 0.056  55
Source: Amadeus data set 
 
Table A3 - Gross Job Flows by Industrial Sector in Non-manufacturing 
 
year nace2  industry pos  neg  gross  net  exc  n 
1999 45  Construction  0.043 0.142 0.185  -0.099  0.086  202
1999 50 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel  0.090 0.139 0.229 -0.049 0.180  29
1999 51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.120 0.102 0.222  0.017  0.205  97
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1999 52 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of personal and household 
goods  0.068 0.166 0.234 -0.098 0.136  86
1999  55  Hotels and restaurants  0.063 0.329 0.393 -0.266 0.126  21
1999  60  Land transport; transport via pipelines  0.017 0.128 0.145 -0.111 0.034  178
1999 61  Water  transport  0.051 0.114 0.166  -0.063  0.103  9 
1999 62  Air  transport  0.074 0.307 0.381  -0.234  0.147  9 
1999 63 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies  0.023 0.159 0.183 -0.136 0.047  64
1999  64  Post and telecommunications  0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.001  8 
1999 65 
Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension  funding  0.099 0.000 0.099 0.099 0.000  1 
1999  70  Real estate activities  0.018 0.111 0.128 -0.093 0.036  58
1999 71 
Renting of machinery and equipment without 
operator and of personal and household goods  0.023 0.000 0.023 0.023 0.000  1 
1999  72  Computer and related activities  0.000 0.101 0.101 -0.101 0.000  2 
1999 73  Research  and  development  0.012 0.163 0.175  -0.151  0.024  71
1999 74  Other  business  activities  0.027 0.100 0.128  -0.073  0.055  80
1999 75 
Public administration and defense; compulsory 
social security  0.253 0.045 0.298 0.208 0.090  3 
1999  80  Education  0.116 0.034 0.150 0.082 0.068  9 
1999  85  Health and social work  0.003 0.170 0.173 -0.167 0.006  25
1999 90 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and 
similar activities  0.022 0.111 0.134 -0.089 0.045  9 
1999  92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  0.078 0.060 0.138  0.018  0.121  14
1999  93  Other service activities  0.064 0.179 0.243 -0.114 0.128  4 
2000 45  Construction  0.074 0.147 0.221  -0.072  0.149  202
2000 50 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel  0.136 0.191 0.327 -0.055 0.272  29
2000 51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles  0.132 0.149 0.281 -0.017 0.264  97
2000 52 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of personal and household 
goods  0.122 0.117 0.238 0.005 0.234 86
2000  55  Hotels and restaurants  0.026 0.136 0.162 -0.110 0.052  21
2000  60  Land transport; transport via pipelines  0.260 0.092 0.351  0.168  0.184  178
2000 61  Water  transport  0.014 0.097 0.111  -0.083  0.028  9 
2000 62  Air  transport  0.083 0.216 0.299  -0.133  0.166  9 
2000 63 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies  0.011 0.071 0.082 -0.060 0.022  64
2000  64  Post and telecommunications  0.019 0.027 0.046 -0.008 0.038  8 
2000 65 
Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding  0.000 0.240 0.240 -0.240 0.000  1 
2000  70  Real estate activities  0.059 0.073 0.133 -0.014 0.119  58
2000 71 
Renting of machinery and equipment without 
operator and of personal and household goods  0.000 0.393 0.393 -0.393 0.000  1 
2000  72  Computer and related activities  0.252 0.000 0.252  0.252  0.000  2 
2000 73  Research  and  development  0.034 0.092 0.126  -0.059  0.067  71
2000 74  Other  business  activities  0.053 0.143 0.196  -0.089  0.107  80
2000 75 
Public administration and defense; compulsory 
social security  0.000 0.111 0.111 -0.111 0.000  3 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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2000 80  Education  0.101 0.135 0.237  -0.034  0.203  9 
2000  85  Health and social work  0.037 0.115 0.152 -0.077 0.074  25
2000 90 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and 
similar activities  0.003 0.066 0.070 -0.063 0.007  9 
2000  92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  0.249 0.027 0.275  0.222  0.053  14
2000  93  Other service activities  0.020 0.137 0.157 -0.117 0.040  4 
Source: Amadeus data set William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Table A4 – Trade Flows by Industrial Sector and Trading Area in Manufacturing 
(% of Total) 
All countries  CIS countries 
Non-CIS 
countries  Industry 
imports exports imports exports imports  exports
Mining of coal and lignite  4.05  0.60  5.38  0.44  3.54  0.72 
Manufacture of food 
products and beverages  7.47  10.59  2.89  19.94  9.25  3.97 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products  1.83  0.25  0.52 0.54 2.34 0.05 
Manufacture  of  textiles  4.64  1.31  3.02 0.91 5.26 1.59 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel; dressing and 
dyeing  of  fur  0.49  2.50  0.12 0.24 0.63 4.10 
Manufacture of leather and 
leather  products  0.96  1.31  0.48 0.50 1.14 1.89 
Manufacture of wood and 
wood  products  0.85  0.59  1.06 0.17 0.77 0.89 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and  paper  products  3.53  0.89  3.66 1.58 3.48 0.41 
Publishing, printing, 
reproduction of recorded 
media  0.54  0.33  0.23 0.31 0.66 0.34 
Manufacture of coke, 
refined petroleum products 
and  nuclear  fuel  10.91 2.10 16.21  1.61 8.85 2.45 
Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products  14.95  12.47  11.61  9.19  16.25  14.79 
Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic  products  4.01  2.44  3.10 4.88 4.37 0.71 
Manufacture of other non-
metallic  mineral  products 2.20  1.53  1.96 2.25 2.29 1.02 
Manufacture of basic 
metals  1.52  21.03  2.94 16.60 0.98 24.18 
Manufacture of fabricated 
metal  products  6.14  21.23  9.75 12.88 4.74 27.15 
Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  16.90  7.76  18.72  13.88  16.20  3.42 
Manufacture of office 
machinery  and  computers 1.06  0.09  0.04 0.16 1.45 0.05 
Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c.  3.65  2.76  4.17 4.81 3.44 1.31 
Manufacture of radio, 
television and 
communication  equipment    2.79  0.52  0.60 0.55 3.64 0.49 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Manufacture of medical, 
precision and optical 
instruments, watches and 
clocks  2.36  0.51  1.39 0.93 2.74 0.20 
Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers  4.52  1.30  5.17 2.65 4.26 0.35 
Manufacture of other 
transport equipment  2.01  3.40  2.69 3.48 1.74 3.34 
Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacture  n.e.c.  1.23  0.36  0.20 0.43 1.62 0.31 
Recycling  0.35  3.12  0.49 0.69 0.29 4.84 
Electricity, gas, steam and 
hot  water  supply  1.04  1.00  3.59 0.39 0.05 1.44 
Collection, purification and 
distribution  of  water  0  0  0 0 0 0 
Total  (%)  100  100  100 100 100 100 
Total (1000’s USD)  8145623 11684914 2273702 4848568 5871921 6836346
Note: Imports and exports are taken as averages of 1996-98. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 521 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 E.g. Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996); Bilsen and Konings (1998); Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) 
and Richter and Schaffer (1996).  In contrast, Konings and Lehmann (2002) find different employment 
adjustment of privatised and state-owned Russian firms. 
 
2 For a detailed description of this data set see Stavrunova (2001). 
 
3 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) present alternative ways to compute standard errors of job flow 
rates. 
 
4 An index measuring the absolute level of openness of a sector employed by Klein, Schuh and Triest 
(2002) might be preferable but requires reliable data on production, unavailable in the Ukrainian case. 
 
5 See Blanchard and Kramer (1997). 
 
6Figure 1 shows official GDP, wage and employment data furnished by Derzhkomstat. Activities of the 
informal sector, which might be quite large in Ukraine, are not included in GDP. Nevertheless, it is 
inconceivable that the widening scissors between real GDP and employment is solely a statistical artefact. 
   
7 The Derzhkomstat data set that we use has reliable data on real output only until 1999, so we have to 
exclude the year 2000 from the analysis here.  
 
8 The only transition economy where an extremely large contraction of output of a domestic industry was 
translated in an equiproportional fall in employment was Eastern Germany, where often 90% of the 
workforce of a firm was permanently laid off. No other transition economy has the social safety net of 
Eastern Germany, financed with transfers from Western Germany, certainly not the countries of the Former 
Soviet Union. In Ukraine, because of a lack of serious reform efforts in the first part of the nineties, output 
did collapse in some industries on a similar scale as in Eastern Germany. But even in authoritarian Ukraine 
it would have been political suicide to make redundant large parts of the workforce. 
 
9We do not pursue a more formal way to establish this result here since for many industries the number of 
industries is small. A far larger reallocation within industries than between them has been reported by most 
studies on job gross flows in transition countries, though.   
 
10For a discussion of how to construct confidence intervals from bootstrapped standard errors, see Efron 
and Tibshirani (1993). The confidence intervals are not presented in the paper but are available on request.  
 
11Pos and neg are the two job flow measures from which the other three measures are derived. The 
bootstrapping procedure treats the sample as a population and draws 1000 random samples with 
replacement, then calculates the mean and the standard deviation of the job flow measure in question. This 
standard deviation is then the bootstrapped standard error. If there is more variation in e.g. job creation than 
in job destruction, this will show up as a larger standard deviation of the first job flow measure. In other 
words, very precise estimates hint at uniform behaviour across the sampled firms, while imprecise 
estimates hint at heterogeneous behaviour on a large scale. 
 
12 See the cited literature in the introduction of the paper. 
 
13 The tabulated one-year persistence rates by size categories and ownership type in the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing sectors are not shown here, but available upon request.  
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